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Abstract—This paper describes our experiences with three
different crime networks in the UK: burglary, ‘gun’ gangs
and retail theft. We present an introduction into each of these
problems, and highlight some of the issues related to over-
simplification of the network analysis.
We also review the term ‘third-generation’ analysis, and
provide some insights into achieving this, but also conclude that
it can be an extremely computationally expensive undertaking.
I. INTRODUCTION
Social network analysis has been applied across a wide
range of domains, providing a unifying language to describe
disparate systems ranging from social interactions to power
grids; there is also a growing body of literature applied to
crime analysis (see [1]–[8]).
Within the deterministic literature of criminology and crime
informatics we find what Klerks calls ‘third-generation’ ana-
lysis [1]. The first generation (crime) analysis techniques were
the Anacpapa charts [9] and maps with coloured pins [10].
Second generation techniques include the range of tools avail-
able to crime analysts, from powerful freeware (e.g. Pajek)
to mid-range solutions offering operationally useful measures
beyond standard social network analysis computations (e.g.
IBM i2 COPLINK and IBM i2 Analyst’s Notebook, ORA [8]),
to significantly more expensive bespoke solutions (e.g. Det-
ica NetReveal). The second generation techniques essentially
provided graphical representations of simple raw data. Actual
content, let alone meaning of such contacts, was analysed only
in a very crude way [1].
A number of researchers [7], [11] offer a related approach,
analysing the strength of weak ties in crime through steady
state equilibria modelling, however Klerks [1] was interested in
understanding in a qualitative way the behaviour, motivations
and choices of the individuals concerned and contributing to
a better understanding of vital social processes, power and
affinity structures. Certainly there were misconceptions within
law enforcement, particularly with holding simplistic views of
their adversaries [1].
II. DISAMBIGUATING NETWORKS: THE MEANING OF
LINKS
Work with the crime type of burglary, in collaboration with
West Midlands Police in the UK, investigated the combination
of social network measures with spatial data. Links in this
dataset were based on codefendence. Incorporated directly
into the betweenness calculation were values for offender
range (geographical difference between linked offenders), the
‘danger’ of an offender (amount of crimes committed) and the
strength of links (product of amount of co-crimes and recency
of last crime) [12]. This resulted in a weighted betweenness
value that better reflected the importance of an offender.
Figure 1. Geographical networks of burglars. Each of the 2x2 squares
represents an offender, with Unique Reference Number (URN), number of
crimes (N) and betweeness value (B). The crime positions are displayed in
interpolated form. The links between offenders are labelled with dates, as days
from the start of the project.
From the large networks of linked offenders (n=17000),
however it was not clear whether the link could be considered
strong or weak, recent or old, and offender pairs committing
many crimes together in the recent past would appear the same
as those offenders whose activity together was a long time
passed through only a single crime.
While the betweenness metric can be useful, it is clear
that in the case of crime types such as burglary there is also
the need to consider the spatial aspect. Consideration of the
temporal and frequency analysis of the crimes constituting the
links will also provide a better understanding of the nature
of the links, and may highlight links that are not considered
significant by the betweenness metric.
III. GUN GANGS
The UK has been slow in carrying out research into
gang crime, excepting Pitts [13], and especially into what
actions work best at controlling it. Greater Manchester, a
region in the north of the UK has had a significant gun crime
problem througout the 2000s [14], [15], related to gang activity
(primarily due to acute social deprivation in the area).
Reported elsewhere [16], in collaboration with the UK’s
Greater Manchester Police, the dynamics of a social network
study of these gangs and their associates was performed using
the intelligence gathered by police observations of known
gang members and associated criminals. Links between of-
fenders are a range of intelligence types, from codefendent to
‘seen together’. This reinforces the value of using social net-
work analysis for gang research: identifying structural holes,
betweenness and social capital [17].
Figure 2 shows links between two rival gangs. In 2000,
Gangs A and B were rivals. These later divided in 2001 into
Gang C (from A) and into Gang D (from B) in 2004. We
investigated this process based on local features (modularity,
cliques) and global features (clustering coefficient). Identifying
the changes in these could help us identify the possible birth
of new gangs (sub-networks) in the social system.
Figure 2. Rival gangs A and B.
Studying the dynamics of these networks globally and
locally, we identified the global characteristics that tell us that
they are not random graphs – they are small world graphs
and therefore the formation of gangs is not a random event.
However, there is much more to analyse, based on the specific
nature of the links, and the complex histories of each offender.
IV. THIRD-GENERATION ANALYSIS
Recalling the definition presented earlier, ‘third-generation’
social network analysis focuses much more intensely on the
content of the contacts, on the social context, and on the in-
terpretation of such information. We are particularly interested
in what constitutes the bonding mechanisms that tie people
together in different constellations: greed, ethnic or tribal ties,
family relations, common geographical (neighbourhood) or
institutional (prison) [1].
A. Specific gang roles
There are many definitions of gangs; for instance Pitts [13]
reviews a plethora of definitions and typologies, eventually de-
veloping their own six-point typology for their particular study.
Aldridge et al. [18] recognise the messiness and looseness
of the social networks referred to as gangs, as well as their
permeable and fluctuating boundaries. In contrast, Pitts [19]
claims, arguably without providing much evidence for it,
that we are witnessing the development of new articulated
‘supergangs’ with long histories of involvement in organised
crime, clear subgroups, role differentiation, established ter-
ritories and neighbourhood control, vertical links into higher
echelon organised crime, and organised drug dealing activity.
The degree values from our analysis the the gangs sug-
gested that there are no obvious single leaders, however
intelligence suggests that South Manchester gangs in the UK
do appear to have a basic system of hierarchy. Gang’s A and
B members store firearms at the home addresses of younger
affiliates of the gang, who are eager to prove themselves to
‘superior’ members of the gang.
While defined roles may give the impression of organisa-
tion within the group however the lifestyle of gang mem-
bers is often disorganised and unplanned. Detailed qualitat-
ive/ethnographic descriptions tend to portray gangs as loosely-
structured groups that lack clear role expectations and stable
leadership [20]. Firearms incidents between gangs are sporadic
in their nature and often have the hallmarks of chance en-
counters with members of opposing gangs, which makes them
difficult to anticipate. We should also be careful when looking
at data and creating networks from it. However, Klerks [1] cites
the case of the ‘conspiracies’ and mega-hierarchies that police
had identified in the past among Dutch and Turkish organised
crime which were in fact strings of interlinked smaller groups
that lacked a central leader but that coordinated their activities
along logistic trails and through bonds of friendship.
B. Link analysis
We require a better analysis of link types, for instance
in the study by Patacchini and Zenou [7] of whether weak
ties play an important role in explaining criminal activities.
They developed a model where individuals learn about crime
opportunities by interacting with other peers. The theoretical
predictions of the model are confirmed by the empirical
analysis since they find that weak ties, as measured by friends
of friends, have a positive impact on criminal activities.
To give a better idea of the interconnectedness of the gangs,
the following Figure 3 demonstrates a cycle in the data, passing
from one gang to another via intermediaries. This example
has been chosen from the 2001 data when one of the new
gangs emerged. Plotted in this way we can see the complex
relationships between (rival and sympathetic) offenders in this
geographically small region.
Furthermore, for 2001 and 2004, it would be interesting to
examine the kinds of links within each gang which emerged.
V. RETAIL OFFENDING TEAMS
Retail is one of the largest economic sectors in the UK,
yet the impact of criminal activity in this domain has received
relatively little attention. Customer theft of goods from shops
can account for almost half of stock loss, but there have
been few studies on this issue. There is an clear need for
Figure 3. Cycle (2001). The tension is between Gangs A (red), B (blue),
C (green) and D (yellow). A(M) is a member of the Gooch gang (Gang A),
however they are coloured black to represent the crime of murder.
more research and Ewart and Tate [21] discuss how the
investigation of retail offending is able to draw upon a body
of criminological findings and methodologies [22].
A unique database was used, held by the UK’s North East
Retail Crime Partnership (NERCP) 1. This is a partnership
between 29 retail chains, 11 shopping centres, 6 town/city
centre partnerships and 4 police forces in the North East of
England. It has extensive data sharing links to other regional
partnerships across the UK. This includes Yorkshire and Hum-
ber Business Crime Forum and the Scottish Business Crime
Centre and a further 11 police forces feed into the system.
Information on over 30,000 offenders and 102,000 incidents
in any twelve month period are recorded and include admitted
cases reported to the police as well as those where the retailer
has chosen not to report. Despite an emerging operational need,
there are no studies of retail criminality, therfore there is a need
to explore the organised teams of offenders.
A. Motivation for the study
The proportion of shop theft/refund abuse committed with
the objective of determining an empirical basis for informing
targeting priorities. The problems of aggregated data [23] are
addressed by using a disaggregated approach to establish more
precisely the geographical nature of ‘prolificness’. We expect
a teams activities to be more geographically dispersed in
comparison to members’ individual offending.
The constitution, stability and roles within teams with the
objective of informing detection and prevention strategies. We
expect to identify key individuals who provide the core and
temporary members who are brought in for specific purposes
such as the distraction of security staff. The offending patterns
of commuting teams and explore geographic/temporal factors
associated with target selection with the objective of informing
detection and prevention strategies. We expect to identify
1http://www.nercp.org.uk/
factors associated with target selection and delineate teams
according to offending patterns.
B. Retail theft data
All NERCP data is collected using the National Informa-
tion/Intelligence Report Form (5x5x5) 2 approved by Associ-
ation of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and conforms to stand-
ards required by Police National Intelligence Model [24]. The
data comprises information recorded by retailers on sightings
of known offenders and all incidents of shop theft and refund
abuse detected in their stores (whether subsequently reported
to the police or not) and includes biographical details of the
offenders. Detected crimes are defined by the apprehension
of the offender. The study is anchored to the North East
England in that the travelling patterns of offenders based in this
region are explored and contrasted with information on those
travelling too the region. Detections and sightings are analysed
to derive an empirical definition of ‘a team’ of offenders and
explore a typology related to membership stability, offending
range or type of offending.
A preliminary analysis of NERCP data on one police force
area reveals that prolific offenders more often act in teams.
Thirty people committed between 17 and 44 offences of retail
crime during 2006 and 24 of them committed almost all their
offences with more than one other. All these ‘team players’
have a large criminal range and operate across two or more
police force areas.
There are also no studies of retail criminality that explore
offenders who travel widely to commit their offences. Findings
from burglary [25]–[27] suggest locations will be significant
to at least one of the group members, or a retail chain may
be targeted across the country because a corporate strategy
produces similar security systems in all its stores. Little is
known of their offending patterns in a chosen area. They may
‘forage’ [28] where numerous premises within a relatively
small geographical range are targeted. Alternatively, they may
‘hit and run’ a few shops over a wider area to avoid detection.
Understanding the temporal and geographical characteristics of
offending have provided important crime prevention and de-
tection information, yet retail offending remains to be explored
in this way.
C. Identifying teams of retail offenders
Intelligence had identified nearly 20 gangs with identifiable
modus operandi and/or membership (e.g. family, or from a
specific geographical region). We were interested to see if
we could find these gangs by automatically partitioning the
data. In this way, if we are able to find our known gangs
in certain partitions of the data, perhaps un-labelled partitions
might indicate previously unknown gangs.
Our tangled network of relations consisted of 31106 ver-
tices with 12742 edges. We used weak components method
to partition the data, with increasing number of nodes. The
resulting partitions or list of networks were extracted. Actual
values of nodes versus partitions (for n=10) were: 1-22133, 2-
3807, 3-926, 4-320, 5-153, 6-93, 7-67, 8-49, 9-34, 10-26. That
is, when we considered networks to be of size 1 node, then
2http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/mlr3cmanual/mlr3c14000.htm
we found 22133 members or partitions. When we considered
networks to be of size 2 node, then we found 3807 members
or partitions, and so on. The size we initially decided to
investigate was 10-node weak components with a resultant of
26 partitions or sub-networks.
Of the 20 known gangs we were able to identify 12 from
our partitions, or at least 12 networks that had at least one
member from the gang members. However it was initially
surprising to see how interconnected several of the gangs were.
Using shortest paths we identified the following paths between
the following gang’s (anonymised to): CM, AR and SEA.
Figure 4. Shortest path between Offender 49467 (Gang CM) and Offender
51187 (Gang AR).
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The picture painted by the initial social network plot is
quite misleading in all three cases we have presented. The
burglary data required spatial data and other features to really
start to understand the meaning of the links between offend-
ers [28], [29]. In the gun gangs, the police held hypothesis
of two rival sets of gangs is potentially a misrepresentation
of the much more complex sets of smaller cliques and fluid
changes within the larger gang structures. Not only are the
links between offenders of very different natures, but the nodes
or offenders themselves are very different as well. How to
represent the changing nature of an individual is something we
have looked at elsewhere [16]. Finally then the very complex
data of retail crime, with a fraction of known gangs, presents its
own particular challenges, of how to make use of quite detailed
intelligence on individuals (in textual format) and combine
with mining of the social networks.
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